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FUNCTION OF LANGUAGE AND
COGNITION IN THINKING
Do we think with language, or is it just
a communication device used for expres-
sion of completed thoughts? What is a
difference between language and cogni-
tion? Chomsky (1995) suggested that these
two abilities are separate and indepen-
dent. Cognitive linguistics emphasizes a
single mechanism for both (Croft and
Cruse, 2004). Evolutionary linguistics con-
siders the process of transferring language
from one generation to the next one
(Cangelosi and Parisi, 2002; Christiansen
and Kirby, 2003; Hurford, 2008). This
process is a “bottleneck” that forms the
language. Brighton et al. (2005) demon-
strated emergence of compositional lan-
guage due to this bottleneck. Still, none
of these approaches resulted in a com-
putational theory explaining how humans
acquire language and cognition. Here I
discuss a computational model overcom-
ing previous difficulties and based on a
hypothesis that language and cognition are
two separate and closely integrated abili-
ties. I identify their functions and discuss
why human thinking ability requires both
language and cognition.
Among fundamental mechanisms of
cognition are mental representations,
memories of objects and events (Perlovsky,
2001, 2006a). The surrounding world is
understood by matching mental repre-
sentations to patterns in sensor signals.
However, mathematical modeling of this
process since the 1950s met with difficul-
ties. The first difficulty is related to a need
to consider combinations of sensor signals,
objects, and events. The number of com-
binations is very large and even a limited
number of signals or objects form a very
large number of combinations, exceeding
all interactions of all elementary particles
in a lifetime of the Universe (Perlovsky,
1998). This is known as combinatorial
complexity, CC. This difficulty in mod-
eling the mind has been overcome by
dynamic logic (Perlovsky, 2001, 2006a,b,
2007a; Perlovsky et al., 2011). Whereas
classical logic considers static statements
such as “this is a chair,” dynamic logic
models processes from vague to crisp rep-
resentations. These processes do not need
to consider combinations, an initial vague
state of a “chair” matches any object in the
field of view, and at the end of the pro-
cess it matches the chair actually present,
without CC.
The second difficulty is similar still
even more complex. It is related to the
fact that “events” and “situations” in the
world do not necessarily exist “ready for
cognition.” There are many combinations
of percepts and objects, a near infin-
ity, events and situations important for
understanding and learning have to be
separated from those that are just ran-
dom collections of meaningless percepts
or random objects (Perlovsky and Ilin,
2012). Events and situations recognized
by non-human animals are very limited
compared to human abilities to differenti-
ate events in the world. Human cognitive
abilities acquire their power due to lan-
guage. Language is “easier” to learn than
cognitive representations. Language rep-
resentations: words, phrases exist in the
surrounding language “ready made,” cre-
ated during millennia of cultural evolu-
tion. Therefore, language could be learned
without much real-life experience; only
interactions with language speakers are
required. Every child learns language early
in life before acquiring full cognitive
understanding of events and their cogni-
tive meanings. Thus, language is learned
early in life with only limited cognitive
understanding of the world (Perlovsky,
2009a, 2012c). Cognitive representations
of situations and abstract concepts ini-
tially exist in vague states. Throughout
the rest of life, language guides acqui-
sition of cognitive representations from
experience. Vague cognitive representa-
tions become more crisp and concrete.
Thinking involves both language and cog-
nition, and as we discuss later thinking
about abstract ideas usually involves lan-
guage more than cognition, not too differ-
ent from thinking by children.
THE DUAL HIERARCHY
Cognitive representations are organized
in mind in an approximate hierarchy
(Grossberg, 1988) from sensor-motor per-
cepts near “bottom,” to objects “higher
up,” to situations, and to still more abstract
cognitive representations. Language rep-
resentations are organized in a parallel
hierarchy from sounds, and words for
objects and situations, to phrases, and to
more abstract language representations.
Our previous discussion can be described
by an integrated mathematical model of
language and cognition forming a dual
hierarchy (Perlovsky, 2009a), as illustrated
in Figure 1. Neural evidence suggests that
the hierarchy is approximate, not as defi-
nite as shown in this figure.
Hierarchical organization of cogni-
tion and related brain structures are
reviewed in (Badre, 2008). In particular,
anterior-posterior axis corresponds to a
gradient of abstract-concrete cortex func-
tions. Hierarchical organization of lan-
guage functions is also well established.
However, hierarchical organization of lan-
guage does not correspond to a par-
ticular spatial axis in the brain, it is
distributed (Price, 2012). Therefore, the
dual hierarchy in Figure 1 is a func-
tional hierarchy not organized along a
spatial axis in the brain as in this fig-
ure. A fundamental aspect of acquiring
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FIGURE 1 | The dual hierarchy. Language and
cognition are organized into approximate dual
hierarchy. Learning language is grounded in the
surrounding language throughout the hierarchy.
Cognitive hierarchy is grounded in experience
only at the very “bottom.”
mental representations is interaction
between higher and lower layer represen-
tations (top and bottom layers). In this
interaction a lower layer representations
are organized in more abstract and gen-
eral concept-representations at a higher
layer. These interactions are referred to as
bottom-up and top-down signals (BU and
TD) indicated in Figure 1 by vertical arrows.
Mathematical model of the dual hier-
archy is described in Perlovsky (2009a,
2012c) and Perlovsky and Ilin (2010,
2012). This model explains many facts
about thinking, language, and cognition,
which has remained unexplainable and
would be considered mysteries, if not so
commonplace.
The dual model makes a number of
experimentally testable predictions. (1) It
explains functions of language and cog-
nition in thinking: cognitive representa-
tions model surrounding world, relations
between objects, events, and abstract con-
cepts. Language stores culturally accu-
mulated knowledge about the world, yet
language is not directly connected to
objects, events, and situations in the world.
Language guides acquisition of cognitive
representations from random percepts and
experiences, according to what is consid-
ered worth learning and understanding in
culture. Events that are not described in
language are likely not even noticed or per-
ceived in cognition. (2) Whereas language
is acquired early in life, acquiring cognition
takes a lifetime. The reason is that lan-
guage representations exist in surrounding
language “ready-made,” acquisition of lan-
guage requires only interaction with lan-
guage speakers, but does not require much
life experience. Cognition on the oppo-
site requires life experience. (3) This is the
reason why abstract words excite only lan-
guage regions of brain, whereas concrete
words excite also cognitive regions (Binder
et al., 2005). The dual model predicts that
abstract concepts are often understood as
word descriptions, but not in terms of
objects, events, and relations among them.
(4) This model explains why language is
acquired early in life, whereas cognition
takes a lifetime. It also explains why chil-
dren can acquire the entire hierarchy of
language including abstract words with-
out experience necessary for understanding
them. (5) Since dynamic logic is the basic
mechanism for learning language and cog-
nitive representations, the dual model sug-
gests that language representations become
crisp after language is learned (5–7 years
of age), however, cognitive representations
may remain vague for much longer; the
vagueness is exactly the meaning of “con-
tinuing learning,” this takes longer for more
abstract and less used concepts. (6) The
dual model gives mathematical description
of the recursion mechanism (Perlovsky and
Ilin, 2012). Whereas Hauser et al. (2002)
postulate that recursion is a fundamental
mechanism in cognition and language, the
dual model suggests that recursion is not
fundamental, hierarchy is a mechanism of
recursion.
(7) Another mystery of human-
cognition, not addressed by cognitive or
language theories, is basic human irra-
tionality. This has been widely discussed
and experimentally demonstrated follow-
ing discoveries of Tversky and Kahneman
(1974), leading to the 2002 Nobel Prize.
According to the dual hierarchy model,
the “irrationality” originates from the
dichotomy between cognition and lan-
guage. Language is crisp and conscious
while cognition might be vague and
ignored when making decisions. Yet, col-
lective wisdom accumulated in language
may not be properly adapted to one’s
personal circumstances, and therefore
be irrational in a concrete situation. In
the 12th century Maimonides wrote that
Adam was expelled from paradise because
he refused original thinking using his own
cognitive models, but ate from the tree of
knowledge and acquired collective wisdom
of language (Levine and Perlovsky, 2008).
EMOTIONAL PROSODY AND ITS
COGNITIVE FUNCTION
The dual model implies connections
between language and cognitive represen-
tations, indicated by a wide horizontal
arrow in Figure 1. These neural connec-
tions have to be developed and main-
tained. This requires motivation, in other
words, emotions. These emotions must
be in addition to utilitarian meanings of
words, otherwise only practically useful
words would be connected to their cogni-
tive meanings. Also these emotions must
“flow” from language to cognition, so that
language is able to perform its cognitive
function of guiding acquisition of cogni-
tive representations, organizing experience
according to cultural contents of language.
These emotions therefore must be con-
tained in language sounds, before cogni-
tive contents are acquired.
This requirement of emotionality of lan-
guage sounds is surprising and contradic-
tory to assumed direction of evolution of
language. Evolution of the language abil-
ity required rewiring of human brain in
the direction of freeing vocalization from
uncontrollable emotions (Deacon, 1997;
Perlovsky, 2009b). Yet, the dual model
requires that language sounds be emo-
tional. Emotionality of human voice is
most pronounced in songs (Perlovsky, 2010,
2012a,d, 2013b). Emotions of everyday
speech are low, unless affectivity is specif-
ically intended. We may not notice emo-
tions in everyday “non-affective” speech.
Nevertheless, this emotionality is impor-
tant for developing the cognitive part of
the dual model. If language is highly emo-
tional, speakers are passionate about what
they say, however, evolving new meanings
might be slow, emotional ties of sounds
to old meanings might be “too strong.”
If language is low-emotional, new words
are easy to create, however, motivation to
develop the cognitive part of the dual model
might be low, the real-worldmeaning of lan-
guage sound might be lost. Cultural values
might be lost as well. Indeed languages dif-
fer in how strong are emotional connections
between sounds and meanings. This leads
to cultural differences. Thus, the dual model
leads to Emotional Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis
(Perlovsky, 2007b, 2009b, 2012b). Strength
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of emotional connections between sound
and meaning depends on language inflec-
tions. In particular, after English lost most
of its inflections, it became a low emo-
tional language, powerful for science and
engineering. At the same time English is
losing autonomous connections to cultural
values that used to be partially inherent in
language sounds. Fast change of cultural val-
ues during recent past is usually attributed
to progress in thinking, whereas effects of
change in emotionality of language sounds
have not been noticed.
Emotional prosody can be impor-
tant for overcoming cognitive dissonance.
Cognitive dissonance is a discomfort
due to holding contradictory cognitions
(Festinger, 1957; Harmon-Jones et al.,
2009). It is resolved by discarding con-
tradictions. If a new word contradicts
existing knowledge its meaning might
be discarded. Emotional prosody as well
as songs could be fundamental mecha-
nisms that overcome cognitive dissonance
and enable keeping new contradictory




This article advances a hypothesis about
functions of language and cognition in
thinking, and possible model of their
interactions. This is the only computable
model explaining a number of myster-
ies about language and cognition and
overcoming computational difficulties. It
makes a number of predictions that
could be experimentally tested, including
the following: cognitive representations
model the world, while language repre-
sentations only model language; abstract
cognitive representations can only be
acquired due to language; abstract cogni-
tion is more clearly represented in lan-
guage whereas cognitive representations
may remain vague throughout life.
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